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STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
The following issues were presented for review in the Court 
of Appeals which summarily affirmed the ruling of the trial court 
granting summary judgment to defendants: 
1. Did Associated Title, a title company acting as trustee 
under a deed of trust, have authority at a trustee's sale to 
purchase the trust property on behalf of the beneficiary, Bodell 
Construction ("Bodell"), the plaintiff-appellant in this action? 
2. Does the grant of "full and complete authority regarding 
this foreclosure action," with the understanding that title to the 
trust property would be transferred to the beneficiary, imply 
authority in the trustee to complete the trustee's sale? 
3. Did the trustee, Associated Title, have apparent 
authority to complete the sale? 
4. Did the plaintiff-appellant, Bodell Construction 
Company, ratify the trustee's sale? 
5. Does a beneficiary have discretion to abrogate a 
trustee's sale when it is discovered that the sale was not 
advantageous to it? 
OPINION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
On March 20, 1991, the Utah Court of Appeals issued an Order 
of Affirmance, ordering "That the trial court's ruling granting 
summary judgment is affirmed." Appellant Bodell Construction 
Company's appeal came before the Court of Appeals pursuant to Utah 
Rules of Appellate Procedure 31 and no opinion was issued by the 
court. 
JURISDICTION OF THE SUPREME COURT 
1 
Appellant Bodell Construction Company brings this matter 
before the Supreme Court pursuant to its Petition for a Writ of 
Certiorari. Respondent Snelson does not controvert the 
jursidictional statements set forth at paragraphs 4 and 5 of the 
Petition. 
CQNTRQl^lNC? STATUTES 
Other than Rule 56, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, respondent 
Snelson contends that no constitutional provision, statutes, or 
rules are controlling. 
STATEMENT QF THE CASE 
A. History of the Case. 
In this action, plaintiff Bodell Construction sought to 
recover a deficiency judgment from defendants after it had 
purchased a house and property at a trustee's sale. The defendant 
McOmbers were trustors under a Deed of Trust conveying their house 
and property in Utah County to the trustee to secure a loan made 
by Bodell. On August 31, 1984, the trustee, Associated Title, had 
conducted a trustee's sale at which in its capacity as trustee it 
bid the sum $243,000 for the property. On September 10, 1984, 
Associated Title filed the trustee's deed conveying the property 
to Bodell. Bodell subsequently became dissatisfied with the 
amount that was bid at that sale, and, after consultation with its 
attorneys, Bodell instructed the trustee to "reconvey" the 
property to the McOmbers and to conduct a second trustee's sale at 
which the trustee was instructed to bid $170,000. 
B. Course Of Proceedings. 
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After the second trustee fs sale held in November of 1984, 
Bodell brought this action in the Fourth Judicial District Court 
of Utah County for a deficiency judgment. The trial court 
determined that Bodell was bound by the first trusteefs sale and 
entered summary judgment for defendants: Bodell thereupon 
appealed that judgment and on March 20, 1991, the trial court's 
order granting summary judgment was affirmed by the Court of 
Appeals . 
C. statement of Facts. 
1. In the trial court and in the Court of Appeals, 
defendants/appellees relied entirely upon the testimony of Mr. 
Michael J. Bodell to support their summary judgment. None of the 
following facts which were before the trial court and the Court of 
Appeals have been contradicted by Bodell Construction. 
2. Michael Bodell is a principal of plaintiff-appellant 
Bodell Construction Company, Inc. (Bodell Depo., R.589 at 7.) 
Both are sometimes referred to hereinafter as "Bodell." Landmark 
Mortgage Company is owned and controlled by Roger Terry and 
engages in the mortgage brokering and arranging business. (Terry 
Depo., R.587 at 6,8.) Associated Title Company is a title company 
that sometimes acts as trustee and conducts trustee's sales under 
trust deeds. Blake Heiner is an employee of Associated Title 
Company. (Heiner Depo., R. 588 at 4-6.) 
3. Roger Terry and Landmark Mortgage had arranged 8 to 12 
mortgage loans for Bodell. All were handled in basically the same 
manner—Terry brought Bodell a loan application package describing 
the prospective loan, assisted in the closing of the loan, 
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serviced the loan by collecting payments, handled communications 
on behalf of Bodell with the owner/debtor, and, when foreclosure 
was necessary, Terry handled it for Bodell. (Bodell Depo., R.589 
at 15-17.) 
4. In late 1983, Roger Terry and Landmark Mortgage arranged 
the subject loan for Bodell. Bodell loaned $200,000 to the 
McOmbers and Snelson. Among other things, Terry gave Bodell an 
appraisal showing that the McOmber house was worth $300,000. 
Bodell himself did not look at the property before making the 
loan. (Bodell Depo., R.589 at 14-15, 18.) The loan was to bear 18 
percent per annum as interest and was secured by the McOmber 
residence. (Bodell Depo., R.589 at 14-15 and Depo. Exhibit 2.) 
5. McOmbers and Snelson did not make a payment under the 
loan and so Bodell caused foreclosure proceedings to be initiated. 
(Bodell Depo., R.589 at 24-25.) 
6. Bodell directed Terry to assist him in proceeding with 
foreclosure. (Bodell Depo., R.589 at 25.) He drafted and 
delivered to Terry a letter addressed to Landmark Mortgage Company 
dated January 9, 1984, which stated as follows: 
Gentlemen, 
Please accept this letter as authorization to 
immediately begin foreclosure against the property 
associated with this loan. 
We hereby grant you and the title company of your 
choice full and complete authority regarding this 
foreclosure action. 
Please inform me if you require further 
information. 
Very truly yours, 
4 
s/Michael J. Bodell [Emphasis added.] 
(Bodell Depo., R.589 at 25-27 and Depo. Exhibit 5.) Bodell knew 
that Terry was going to give this letter to a title company and 
assumed that the title company would rely on it. (Bodell Depo., 
R.589 at 26.) Terry gave this letter to Associated Title Company. 
(Terry Depo., R.587 at 40.) 
7. During April, 1984, Bodell signed a Substitution of 
Trustee, appointing Associated Title Company as successor trustee 
under the McOmber Trust Deed. (Bodell Depo., R.589 at 34-35.) 
8. In early May, 1984, Bodell requested that Terry furnish 
him with the appraisal on the McOmber property that was a part of 
the loan application package because Bodell wanted some idea of 
the value of the property being foreclosed. (Bodell Depo., R.589 
at 39-40.) That appraisal indicated that the value of the McOmber 
property was $300,000. (Bodell Depo., R.589 at 18; Depo. Exhibit 
1.) Bodell received no other appraisal prior to the trustee's 
sale. (Bodell Depo., R.589 at 40.) 
9. Associated Title Company issued a Notice of Trustee's 
Sale under the McOmber Trust Deed on July 30, 1984. That Notice 
of Trustee's Sale scheduled the sale for August 31, 1984. (Bodell 
Depo., R.589, Exhibit 11.) Associated Title Company mailed the 
Notice of Trustee's Sale both to Landmark Mortgage Company and to 
Bodell on July 31, 1984, and both Landmark Mortgage Company and 
Bodell received the Notice of Trustee's Sale on August 1, 1984. 
(Bodell Depo., R.589 at 44-45 and 110.) 
10. Bodell knew, prior to August 31, 1984, that there was 
going to be a trustee's sale under the McOmber Trust Deed at that 
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time. (Bodell Depo., R.589 at 45.) Bodell expected that Bodell 
Construction would buy the property at the sale. (Bodell Depo., 
R.589 at 52.) Nevertheless, (1) Bodell never spoke with anyone at 
Associated Title Company prior to the sale, and (2) Bodell did not 
convey any bidding instructions to Landmark or Terry prior to the 
sale. Mr. Bodell knew that Associated Title Company could not 
have received any bidding instructions from him prior to the sale. 
(Bodell Depo., R.589 at 47-48, 52, and 57.) Bodell had a number 
of conversations with Mr. and Mrs. McOmber and their attorney in 
reference to the pending sale (Bodell Depo., R.589 at 46). He had 
several conversations with Roger Terry (Id). He made all of his 
arrangements with Roger Terry (Bodell Depo., R.589 at 48, 109). 
This was the largest second mortgage loan Bodell had made by far 
(Bodell Depo., R.589 at 109). 
11. The testimony differed as to the bidding instructions 
that were given to Associated Title Company. There were disputed 
facts in this area, but these facts were irrelevant to the motion 
for summary judgment before the district court. The parties' 
differing versions are included here only because they will be 
helpful to the Court's understanding of the overall facts and 
because appellant Bodell bases his arguments for Associated 
Title's lack of authority to bid entirely on the purported 
confusion among him, Mr. Terry and Mr. Heiner. 
(a) Associated asserts that it telephoned Terry or his 
office and requested instructions as to what should be 
bid at the trustee's sale and thereafter received a 
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telephone message stating that the payoff at the sale 
was to be $243,127.15. (Heiner Depo., R.588 at 9-10.) 
(b) Terry asserts that Associated requested a "payoff," 
and Terry called Associated Title Company with a 
"payoff amount," which was the full amount owed under 
the loan, including a part of Terry's commission on 
the loan that was then unpaid. (Terry Depo., R.587 at 
56; Affidavit of Roger Terry (Terry Depo., R.587 
Exhibit 24).) 
(c) Bodell asserts that Associated should have bid the 
fair market value of the property, but concedes that 
he gave no one any bidding instructions and that no 
one ever told Associated Title Company what the fair 
market value was. (Bodell Depo., R.589 at 62-65.) 
12. The trustee's sale was conducted on August 31, 1984, and 
Associated made a bid $243,681.90 on behalf of Bodell and 
purchased the property for Bodell Construction. (Bodell Depo., 
R.589, Exhibit 14.) 
13. On September 4, 1984, Blake Heiner signed a Trustee's 
Deed on behalf of Associated Title by which Associated Title 
conveyed to Bodell Construction the McOmber property (Terry Depo., 
R. 587, Exhibit 16) . This Deed was recorded at the Utah County 
Recorder's Office on September 11, 1984 (id.) The Trustee's Deed 
recites, and Heiner confirmed by his examination of the documents 
prior to his deposition, that the sale was conducted in full 
compliance with Utah statutes (Heiner Depo., R.588 at 35). 
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14. Within a week to ten days after the sale on August 31, 
1984, Bodell was told by Terry that the sale had occurred and that 
approximately $240,000 had been bid for the property. (Bodell 
Depo., R. 589 at 67-68.) Bodell testified that, in the same 
conversation, he objected to the amount bid by Associated Title 
Company. (Bodell Depo., R. 589 at 79-80.) 
15. After learning of the sale and bid amount, Bodell 
contacted Cal Monson, a realtor, to list and sell the property. 
Bodell, as owner, signed a Listing Agreement with Monson, 
authorizing Monson to sell the property for $239,000. (Bodell 
Depo., R. 589 at 70-72, Exhibit 16.) When Bodell signed the 
Listing Agreement as owner, he knew that Bodell Construction owned 
the property because it had purchased it at a trustee's sale, that 
the bid price had been wrong at that trustee's sale, and that 
Bodell did not like the bid. (Bodell Depo., R. 589 at 71, 80.) 
16. During late September, 1984, Bodell received from Roger 
Terry a rent check in the amount of $200.00 from Jeff and Kathy 
Kober, who were renting the bottom portion of the McOmber home. 
Bodell cashed the check. (Bodell Depo., R.589 at 73-74, Exhibit 
17.) At the time he cashed the check, Bodell understood that the 
money was rent from people who lived in the basement of the 
property that he had purchased at a foreclosure sale, that the bid 
price was wrong at the foreclosure sale, and that he objected to 
that bid price. (Bodell Depo., R. 589 at 74, 80.) 
17. If someone had approached Bodell on September 12, 1984 
(after Bodell knew of the trustee's sale and the amount bid at 
that sale), and offered to purchase the property for $239,000 in 
8 
cash, he would have sold it to them. (Bodell Depo., R. 589 at 72-
73.) 
18. During early October, 1984, Bodell became concerned 
about whether the property was worth what had been bid for it, and 
so Bodell called his attorney, Richard Rappaport, "because I 
wanted to know what we do now that it's becoming obvious to me 
that the property isn't going to solve my debt problem. Isn't 
going to be, isn't going to net us anywhere near what is owed us. 
So the next step was, well, how do we get the difference." (Bodell 
Depo., R. 589 at 77-78.) 
19. On October 3, 1984, Bodell and Terry met with Bodell's 
counsel, Richard Rappaport. At that meeting, according to Terry's 
notes, with which Bodell agrees, "Mr. Rappaport said to get bid 
down must claim trustee did not have authority to bid amount he 
did." (Bodell Depo., R.589 at 82-83, Exhibit 13.) 
20. Thereafter, Rappaport, Bodell, and Terry attempted to 
undo the effects of the first trustee's sale: 
(a) Mr. Rappaport instructed Mr. Terry to call the 
McOmbers and tell them that an error was made and that 
they could stay in the house for another 30 days. 
(Bodell Depo., R. 589 at 84, Exhibit 13.) 
(b) Bodell also instructed Terry to tell McOmbers to keep 
the home on the market but that the ownership listing 
would have to be changed (to reflect McOmbers as 
owner, rather than Bodell, as owner). (Bodell Depo., 
R. 589 at 85, Exhibit 13.) 
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(c) McOmbers did in fact execute a Listing Agreement as 
owners with Cal Monson dated October 4, 1984. (Bodell 
Depo., R. 589 at 85, Exhibit 18.) 
(d) Mr. Rappaport directed Associated Title Company to 
record a Quit Claim Deed conveying the property from 
Bodell Construction Company back to Associated Title 
Company, as trustee, so that another trustee's sale 
could be conducted. (Bodell Depo., R. 589 at 94, 
Exhibit 19.) 
(e) Bodell secured a new appraisal, dated November 6, 
1984, to determine the fair market value of the 
property. (Bodell Depo., R.589 at 95.) 
(f) At the request of Mr. Rappaport, Associated Title 
Company thereafter conducted a second trusteefs sale 
of the property on November 19, 1984 and, at the 
direction of Bodell, bid $170,000. (Affidavit of 
Blake T. Heiner, 5 6.) 
These facts were undisputed before the District Court. The 
"disputed facts" that Bodell raised go only to Bodell, Terry and 
Heiner!s purported misunderstanding about the bid price. The 
undisputed material facts show clearly that defendants-appellees 
were entitled to judgment as a matter of law. 
ARGUMENT 
In his Petition for Certiorari, Bodell argues that the 
summary judgment and the Court of Appeals1 affirmance of it were 
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so clearly erroneous that this Court should grant certiorari for 
the purpose of correcting the error. 
The trial court twice granted summary judgment to the 
defendants. After the first, granted in May, 1987, Bodell 
appealed to this Court. That appeal was dismissed because no Rule 
54(b) Order had been entered (R. 462). On remand, the district 
court allowed the parties to augment the record and after a second 
hearing again entered an order determining that Bodell was bound 
by the first trusteefs sale and granting summary judgment to the 
defendants. (R. 568.) 
In its summary judgment, the trial court concluded that there 
were no issues of material fact, that Associated Title had actual 
implied authority to conduct the trustee's sale and enter a bid, 
that Associated Title had apparent authority to conduct the 
trustee's sale and enter a bid, that Bodell Construction ratified 
the first trustee's sale, and that the confusion among Bodell and 
his agents was not grounds for setting aside the trustee's sale 
(Pet. for Cert. App. B) . After reviewing the record and the 
briefs, the Court of Appeals agreed and summarily affirmed the 
district court's ruling (Pet. for Cert. App. A). 
A. THE UNDISPUTED FACTS BEFORE THE DISTRICT COURT AND 
THE COURT OF APPEALS SHOWED THAT ASSOCIATED TITLE 
HAD ACTUAL AUTHORITY TO ENTER THE BID 
The first trustee's sale conducted on August 31, 1984 was 
valid and binding on Bodell. Bodellfs agent, Associated Title 
had authority to enter a bid. Bodell had written a letter 
granting Landmark Mortgage "and the title company of your choice 
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full and complete authority regarding this foreclosure action," 
and Landmark had chosen Associated Title to handle the 
foreclosure. 
Not only did Associated Title have the express authority 
created by the letter, but it also had implied authority, that 
is, authority incidental to the broader authority given. Bodell 
authorized and directed his agents to complete the foreclosure 
and effect the transfer of the title to Bodell Construction. 
This could not have been accomplished without bidding at the 
trustee's sale. Although there was some confusion between 
Bodell and its agents, Landmark Mortgage and Associated Title, 
concerning the amount to be bid, the claims that have arisen 
from this confusion are between Bodell and his agents, and are 
in fact now being litigated in the Third Judicial District 
Court. (See Appendix A.) 
The actual authority of an agent to act on behalf of his 
principal may be either express or implied. Clark v. Gneiting, 95 
Idaho 10, 501 P.2d 278, 279-280 (1972). This Court has said: 
The actual authority of an agent may be implied 
from the words and conduct of the parties and 
the fact and circumstances attending the 
transaction in question. Implied authority 
embraces authority to do whatever acts are 
incidental t£U or are necessary, usual, and 
proper tn accomplish QV perform, m e main 
authority expressly delegated to the agent. 
[Emphasis added.] 
Bowen v. Olsen, 576 P.2d 862, 864 (Utah 1978). In B & R Supply 
Co. v. Bringhurst, 28 Utah 2d 442, 503 P.2d 1216, 1217 
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(1972) the court said: 
[W]here a principal . . . entrusts a duty to his 
agent or employee, the latter is clothed with 
implied authority to do those things which are 
within the scope of assigned duties or 
reasonably and necessarily incident thereto. 
The Restatement (Second) of Agency, § 35, states the rule as 
follows: 
§ 35 When Incidental Authority is Inferred 
Unless otherwise agreed, authority to conduct a 
transaction includes authority to do acts which 
are incidental to it, usually accompany it, or 
are reasonably necessary to accomplish it. 
These principles applied to the case at hand show clearly that 
Associated Title had implied actual authority to enter the bid at 
the August 29, 1984 Trusteefs sale. 
B. ASSOCIATED TITLE HAD APPARENT AUTHORITY TO MAKE 
THE BIP QF AUGUST 31, 1984 
Associated Title also had apparent authority to make the 
bid. It was clothed with the appearance of authority by Bodell; 
the defendant-trustors (McOmber) were given notice that a sale 
would be held and Bodell had conversations with them before the 
sale; and the McOmberfs interest in the trust property was 
terminated by the sale. These facts satisfy the requirements of 
(1) acts by the principal (Bodell), (2) reliance by the third 
person (McOmber), and (3) a change in the third persons 
circumstances. 
In Walker Bank & Trust Co. v. Jones, 672 P.2d 73 (Utah 1983), 
the court said that apparent authority exists where "a person has 
created such an appearance of things that it causes a third party 
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reasonably and prudently to believe that a second party has the 
power to act on behalf of the first person." 672 P. 2d at 75, 
citing Wynn v. McMahon Ford Co., Mo.App. 414 S.W.2d 330, 336 
(1967) . In these circumstances, it would have been imprudent for 
Mr. McOmber to believe anything else. 
C BODELL RATIFIED THE FIRST TRUSTEE'S SALE AND THE 
BID THAT RESULTED IN BODELL'S PURCHASE 
Bodell ratified Associated Title's acts and the trustee's 
sale. After learning of the sale and the price bid at it, 
Bodell did not object to Associated Title but proceeded to treat 
the property as Bodell Construction's by listing it for sale in 
Bodell Construction's name, by negotiating with McOmber to 
remain in the property pending sale, and by accepting rents from 
the property. Bodell testified that if someone had offered him 
the $239,000 for which he had listed the property, he would have 
sold it. It was only when he decided that the property was not 
worth what he listed it for that Bodell decided to claim his 
trustee acted beyond his authority. 
In Moses v. Archie McFarland & Sonsr 230 P. 2d 571 (Utah 
1951), the court stated: 
Ratification like original authority need not be 
expressed. Any conduct which indicates assent 
by the purported principal to become a party to 
the transaction or which is justifiable only if 
there is ratification is sufficient. Even 
silence with full knowledge of the facts may 
manifest affirmance and thus operate as a 
ratification. 
Id. at 573-574. 
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In Lowe v. April Inds., Inc., 531 P.2d 1297, 1299 (Utah 
1974), this Court stated: 
Ratification is expressed or implied. Implied, 
where it arises under circumstances of 
acquiescence or where a duty to disaffirm is not 
promptly exercised. Knowledge, usually, is a 
requisite to any form of ratification. 
In Lowe
 r the court held that a party with knowledge of a 
transaction and an agent's acts ratified the agent's acts by 
failing to disaffirm them within a reasonable time. See, also, 
Doxey-Layton Co. v. Holbrook, 479 P.2d 348 (Utah 1971). 
These cases stand for the proposition that when a party, 
with knowledge of an alleged unauthorized act of his agent, by 
his conduct indicates that he affirms the agent's act, a 
ratification occurs. "Any conduct which indicates assent by the 
purported principal to become a party to the transaction or 
which is justifiable only if there is ratification is 
sufficient." Moses v. Archie McFarland & Sons, supra at 574. 
Clearly, all these elements were present when Mr. Bodell, with 
knowledge of the trustee's sale and the price bid at it, 
asserted his ownership of the property as though the sale had 
been entirely valid. 
D. BODELL CANNOT NULLIFY THE AUGUST 31, 1984, 
TRUSTEE'S SALE ON THE GROUNDS OF ITS OWN MISTAKE 
ANP CQNPUCT h SECOND SALS FQfi ITS QWN APVANTAGS 
Bodell cannot declare that the first sale was invalid and 
hold a second for his own benefit to the prejudice of the 
trustors. The procedural requirements for trustee's sales are 
intended to protect the debtor/trustors, and there is a strong 
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presumption of the validity of a trustee's sale unless the 
interests of the trustor are prejudiced by an irregularity. 
Occidental/Nebraska Fed. Sav. v. Mehr, 791 P. 2d 217 (Utah App. 
1990) . There is no claim here of procedural irregularity; the 
sale conformed in all respect with statutory requirements. 
Bodell was motivated to abrogate the first sale not by any 
procedural problems, but only when it became "obvious to me that 
the property isn't going to solve my debt problem . . . . So 
the next step was, well, how do we get the difference." (Bodell 
Depo., R.589 at 77-78.) The answer to this question is recorded 
in a note made by Roger Terry of a meeting on October 3, 1984, 
between Bodell, Terry and Bodell1s attorney: "Mr. Rappaport 
said to get bid down must claim trustee did not have authority 
to bid amount he did." (Bodell Depo., R.589 at 82, Exhibit 13.) 
Bodell testified "That in essence is the way I remember it." 
(Bodell Depo., R.589 at 83.) 
Citing Concepts, Inc. v. First Sec. Realty Servs. Inc., 743 
P.2d 1158 (Utah 1987), the Occidental/Nebraska opinion stated the 
rule that: 
A sale once made will not be set aside unless 
the interests of the debtor were sacrificed or 
there was some fraud or unfair dealing. 
791 P.2d at 221. In this action, the beneficiary (Bodell) wants 
the sale set aside solely because he contends his own interests 
were sacrificed. 
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E. NO SPECIAL OR IMPORTANT REASONS EXIST FOR GRANTING 
THE WRIT 
Petitioner is not explicit in its statement of "The 
Importance of the Principles Involved" (See Petition at 17), but 
suggests two: first, that the district court and the Court of 
Appeals departed so far from the accepted standards for the grant 
and review of summary judgment that this court must correct them; 
and second, that such interesting issues of law may be contained 
in the appeal that this Court should review the proceeding below. 
The detailed statement of facts set out above in this brief 
was presented to both the trial court and the Court of Appeals. 
At no point in the proceedings below, has Petitioner pointed to 
one of these statements and said that it controverts the 
statement. Michael Bodell did file an Affidavit (attached as 
Appendix C to the Petition) in which he sets out conclusory 
statements going to questions of law, but it controverted no 
facts . 
Except for certain testimony going to the confusion that 
arose between Mr. Bodell and his agents and to the formalities of 
the trustee's sale, every statement of fact upon which the 
district court relied was based on the deposition of Mr. Bodell. 
Bodell has never attempted to retract, modify or explain any of 
these statements. 
Throughout these proceedings, Bodell has repeated that 
Associated Title had no authority to bid the amount it did bid at 
the August 31, 1984, trustee1s sale. Bodell has consistently 
failed to acknowledge that an agent can breach his duties to his 
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principal yet at the same time bind his principal to third 
parties. However, Bodell has recognized this principle in 
separate proceedings which it has brought against Associated Title 
in the Third Judicial District Court. (See Appendix A to this 
brief.) The trial court and the Court of Appeals correctly 
recognized that if Bodell has any complaint it is against his 
agent, Associated Title, and not against the defendants in this 
action. 
In its Petition (p.27), Bodell suggests that "this case 
presents an opportunity for this Court to address (i) the 
interface between Blodgett [v. Martsch, 590 P.2d 298 (Utah 1978)] 
and any notions of the implied and apparent authority of a 
trustee." Blodgett states the rule that a trustee has strong 
duties to the trustors. The trustors here have made no claim of 
any breach of duty on the part of the trustee. The beneficiary, 
Bodell, has made such claims in its action against Associated 
Title which is pending in the Third Judicial District. The 
Petition also claims that this case affords an opportunity to 
address " (ii) The interface between the trust deed foreclosure 
statutes and the statute of frauds." However, Bodell does not 
explain how this question is of any particular importance. 
Associated Title did have written authority to do everything 
necessary to complete the foreclosure, and there is no doubt that 
it thought it was authorized to make the bid. If Associated Title 
reached this conclusion carelessly, then its liability, if any, 
for its carelessness should be determined in the case pending in 
the Third Judicial District. 
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CONCLUSION 
Petitioner asks that this Court review the trial court and 
the Court of Appeals for the reason that they wrongly decided 
straightforward and uncomplicated issues of law. The issuance of 
the Writ would not serve to correct any errorf since no error was 
made, and even petitioner only suggests but does not argue that 
there are questions of general legal consequence involved in the 
decision below. In fact, as the Court of Appeals' summary 
affirmance suggests, no legal issues of general interest were 
before it. For these reasons, the Petition for a Writ of 
Certiorari should be denied. 
Respectfully submitted this S day of M aY , 
1991. 
DUNN Sc DUNN 
Attorney for 
Appellee Snelson 
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I hereby certify that ^a- true and correct oopy of the 
foregoing BRIEF OF STEVEN M. SNELSON IN OPPOSITION TO PETITION 
FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI was-- mailed, postage prepaid, this & 
day of "7^1 a ^ ^
 r 1991, to the following: 
Keith W. Meade 
COHNE, RAPPAPORT & SEGAL, P.C. 
525 East First South, Fifth Floor 
P.O. Box 11008 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84147-0008 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84147 
B. Ray Zoll 
ZOLL & BRANCH 
5300 South 360 West, 3rd Floor 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84123 
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% 
Keith W. Meade (Bar No. 2218) 
COHNE, RAPPAPORT & SEGAL, P. C. 
525 East First South, Fifth Floor 
P. 0. Box 1 1008 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84147-0008 
Telephone: (801) 532-2666 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
S^-^' rVC } I N AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
TV J * * * * * * * * 
BODELL CONSTRUCTION COMPANY, 
INC., a Utah corporation, 
Plaintiff, 
vs 
ASSOCIATED TITLE COMPANY, 
a Utah corporation, 
Defendant. 
C O M P L A I N 
Civil No 
, *Vs 
The plaintiff complains and alleges as follows 
1. That plaintiff, Bodell Construction Company, Inc 
(hereinafter "Bodell"), is a Utah corporation m good "anain 
with its principal place of business in Salt: Lake Count, Utai 
2. Defendant, Associated Title Company (' Associate: , _s 
Utah corporation in good standing with its principal tlace o 
business in Salt Lake County, Utah. 
3. Many of the activities pertinent to the Complaint a 
alleged herein occurred in Salt Lake County, Utah and this is 
court of competent jurisdiction. 
4. On November 1, 1983, plaintiff loaned to ta^id I 
McOmber and others $200,000.00. The loan was placed thrcugn 
Landmark Mortgage and was secured by a trust deed. 
5. On April 25, 1984, at Entry No. 12206, Book : 1 3 1, Page 
492 in the records of the Utah County Recorder, defendant oeca~e 
the successor trustee under the trust deed. Pars-ar.: :: a 
request made to Roger Terry of Landmark Mortgage by 3:dell, 
Landmark requested Associated to initiate foreclosure 
proceedings under the trust deed. A sale of the property r*as 
scheduled for August 31, 1984. 
6. Prior to the time of the August 31, 1954 sale 
Associated never discussed with Bodell or Landmark ::.e :::dir.: 
procedure or the amount to be bid at the August 3 1 sa.e 
7. Prior to the August 31, 1984 sale, Associated tad 
never spoken with Bodell regarding the sale. Associated Title 
was never given authority by anyone to determine the ar.our.t to be 
bid at the sale. 
8. Prior to the August 31 sale, Associated re: ested 
Landmark to provide it with the payoff amount. On ^ g . s : ^C, 
1984, Landmark called Associated and left a telephone ressage for 
the officer of Associated who requested the information. Tne 
message stated: "payoff on sale tomorrow C$243,12" 15 plus 
foreclosure costs. ,f 
9. No other information regarding the sale was requested 
by Associated. 
10. No one other than Blake Heiner of Associated Title 
participated in the August 31, 1984 trustee's sale. 
11. At the August 31 sale, Associated bid the ahomt or 
$243,681.90 at the trustees sale, purportedly on behalf of bedell 
Construction. 
12. At the time of the sale, the property secured by the 
trust deed had a value of not more than $150,000.00. 
FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION 
13. Plaintiff realleges herein paragraphs 1 through 12. 
14. Associated, as the trustee, had a duty to act with 
reasonable diligence and in good faith with respect to its 
conduct of the August 31 sale. 
15. Associated breached its duty by, among other th.r/js. 
(a) failing to discuss with plaintiff cr his 
representatives any of the procedures regarding the sale or the 
bidding process; 
(b) by failing to discuss with plaintiff or his 
representatives the consequences of bidding in at sale the full 
amount due under the trust deed; 
(c) by bidding in at sale any amount on behalf of 
plaintiff when it had neither requested nor received any 
instructions or authority to enter a bid; 
(d) by bidding in an amount at sale which had teen 
clearly stated to be a payoff amount. 
16. As a result of Associated' s breach, plaintiff has 
:suffered damage in that it was precluded from seeking or 
obtaining a deficiency judgment as against the trustors. 
SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION 
17. Plaintiff incorporates herein the ali?-aa:::r.s c: 
paragraph 1 through 16. 
18. Associated is a professional trustee, licensed ar.dor 
designated under state law to hold the position of trustee 
19. As such, Associated owes plaintiff a higher duty e: 
care and competence. 
20. Plaintiff was entitled to rely on Associated s 
expertise with regard to the information it would both provide 
and request regarding the sale. 
21. As set forth hereinabove, Associated has breamed its 
duty of care, resulting in damage to plaintiff in an amount not 
less than $80, 000. 00. 
WHEREFORE, plaintiff prays that it be awarded judgment as 
against defendant in an amount to be proven at trial, net less 
than $80,000.00, plus interest, costs, and such further relief as 
is just in the premises. 
DATED this • "" ^  day of August, 1988. 
Plaintiff s Address: 
Bode11 Construction 
3640 South 500 West 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
da/bodell. emp 
(cJu!(,-, 
Keith W. Meade 
COHNE, RAPPAPORT & SEGAL 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
525 East First South, 5th Floor 
P. 0. Box 11008 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84147-0C05 
Teleuhone: (801) 532-2666 
In the District Court of the Third Judicial District 
In and for Salt Lake County, State of Utah 
BODELL CONSTRUCTION CO. 
Plaintiff ) Certification of 
vs. ) Readiness for Trial 
ASSOCIATED TITLE CO. I PQQ qq^l I Case No. C 3 8 - b 5 i l 
Defendant 
TO THE DISTRICT COURT: 
KEITH MEADE
 a t t o r n e y f n r plaintiff 
BODELL CONSTRUCTION 
(Plaintiff or Defendant) 
., by his signature below hereby certifies that in his judgment this 
(Name of Client) 
case is ready for trial and in support of such certification counsel represents to the Court as follows: 
1. That all required pleadings have been filed and the case is at issue as to all parties. 
2. That counsel has completed all discovery; that opposing counsel have had reasonable time to pursue discovery; 
and that all discovery of record has been completed. 
3. That if medical testimony is contemplated or required, copies of all existing medical reports have been made 
available to all counsel or parties of record. 
4. That there are no motions that have been filed which remain pending and upon which no disposition has been 
made. 
5. That reasonable discussions to effect settlement have been purused by counsel and their clients but no settlement 
has been effected..(Such discussions are to be realistic in nature and not limited to an unresponded to offer. The duty to 
effectively negotiate lies with all parties.) 
6. Jury trial is demanded If demanded, S50.00 fee xxbKOQDdHScefcx h a s b e e n p a i d , 
(Demanded or Waived) 
7 . T h i s c a s e was p r e v i o u s l y c e r t i f i e d f o r t r i a l . 
(OVER) 
Counsel further hereby certifies that the following counsel or pro se parties of record were furnished with a copy of 
this certificate on the 19th day of A p r i l , 19 91 . whose last known 
addresses and telephone numbers are as follows: 
Name 
B. Ray 
J. Rand 
Kathryn 
Bruce 
Zoll 
Hirschi 
Denholm 
Maak 
^ 
Dated this 
Signature of Attorney 
Address Telephone 
5300 S. 360 W., #360, SLC, 84123 262-1500 
230 S. 500 E., #460, SLC, 84102 
263 E. 2100 S., SLC, 84115 
185 S. State, #1300, SLC, 84111 
521-6666 
19 t h 
. day of. A p r i l 
484-0091 
532-7840 
I 9 _ ! L 
525 E. 100 S . , #500, SLC, 84102 532-2666 
Address Telephone 
NOTICE TO ALL PARTIES 
Any objections to the above certification or any disagreement to any of the matters certified are to be filed in writing 
with the court within ten days of the date hereof, served upon all parties, and noticed up for hearing upon the law and 
motion calendar. 
The foregoing Certificate is to be used in the Third Judicial District Court as the Request for Trial Setting provided 
for in Rule 4.1 of the Rules of Practice of the District and Circuit Courts, effective March 1. 1982. 
BY THE COURT 
